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THE DISJUNCTION BETWEEN JUDGE 
EDWARDS AND PROFESSOR PRIEST 
Louis H. Pollak* 
With characteristic vigor, Judge Harry Edwards, in his essay The 
Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profes-
sion, 1 has censured the law schools and, secondarily, the bar, for what 
he sees as profoundly disturbing trends pulling academics and practi-
tioners farther and farther apart. Judge Edwards' censure is not prof-
fered off the cuff. He has carefully polled his former law clerks on 
their perceptions of their law school years and of their postclerkship 
professional experiences - whether in private practice, in govern-
ment, or in teaching. In the text and footnotes of his essay, Judge 
Edwards quotes his law clerks' responses in considerable and very in-
teresting detail. These responses, largely if not uniformly confirma-
tory of Judge Edwards' own intuitions, constitute much of his 
ammunition. For my part, I must confess that, although I share cer-
tain of Judge Edwards' concerns, I do not view the American legal 
landscape with the same degree of alarm. 
Judge Edwards' central criticism of law schools (institutions that, 
Judge Edwards, as an erstwhile academic of distinction, is particularly 
qualified to judge) is that they are rapidly becoming schools of "the-
ory," giving short shrift to - en route to abandoning - "doctrine." 
This development, Judge Edwards feels, has already put at risk not 
only the law schools' pivotal role as centers of legal research but their 
crucial pedagogical role. 
As faculty research increasingly disfavors "doctrine" in favor of 
"theory," Judge Edwards foresees a breakdown in the vital and long-
established symbiosis between the professoriate - the producers of 
legal scholarship - on the one hand, and the bar and bench - the 
hitherto consumers of legal scholarship - on the other. Lawyers and 
judges, accustomed to looking to the treatises and law review articles 
of "practical" scholars for guidance on "how the legal regime works" 2 
- and, presumably, how to make it work better - will no longer find 
such guidance. 
* U.S. District Judge, Eastern District of Pennsylvania. - Ed. 
1. 91 MICH. L. R.Ev. 34 (1992). 
2. Id. at 56. 
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The pedagogical scene, as Judge Edwards sees it, is just as bleak. 
He feels that the mounting scorn of "theory" -minded professors not 
only for "doctrine" proper but for the very functions lawyers and 
judges perform is threatening to play havoc with what, historically, 
has been the law schools' primary mission - imparting appropriate 
professional instruction to the coming generations of members of the 
bar. 
What sort of instruction is called for? We would of course all 
agree that what is not called for is the rote learning that passes bar 
examinations. Rather, the law schools fulfill their instructional re-
sponsibility by establishing the conditions for a vigorous intellectual 
interchange that embraces: (1) the study of the law's major fields and 
(2) attentive consideration of abiding principles - (a) individual integ-
rity as an advocate and an officer of the court, and (b) collective re-
sponsibility for advancing the social order - that give moral and civic 
definition to the law as a public profession.3 But Judge Edwards 
senses that theoreticians are so indifferent to the problems with which 
3. A wide variety of teaching methods lend themselves to the achievement of these goals. In 
my view probably the most effective method - but also, unfortunately, the most labor-intensive 
method - is the one practiced back in the 1930s by Wiley Rutledge before he left teaching for 
the bench. Rutledge's theory and practice of teaching have been evocatively described by a 
quondam junior academic colleague, Willard Wirtz. As Wirtz explains, Rutledge felt that con-
ventional legal education had serious limitations: 
Wiley Rutledge was proud of the law schools and of the profession for which they train. 
But he spoke out repeatedly against the impersonalness of legal education and against the 
reflections of that same quality in the profession itself. He protested the hollowness of cur-
ricula and courses in which the value elements inherent in sound legal concepts emerge only 
incidentally. He pointed out the inevitability of false emphasis resulting from the climaxing 
of each semester with a series of examinations which reveal only clinical accomplishment. 
We train artisans, he said, while a democratic society pleads for architects. 
Louis H. Pollak, Wiley Blount Rutledge: Portrait of A Judge, in SIX JUSTICES ON CIVIL RIGHTS 
177, 179-80 (Ronald D. Rotunda ed., 1983) (quoting Willard Wirtz, In Memory of Wiley Blount 
Rutledge, PROC. OF THE BAR & OFFICERS OF THE U.S. SUP. Cr. 19, 20-21 (Apr. 10, 1951)). As 
Wirtz tells it, Rutledge realized that, in order to overcome the artificiality of classroom presenta-
tion, what was critical was: 
treating his students as human beings, getting to know them as individuals. He did this, 
seemingly oblivious to the other demands upon his time, by opening his office door and his 
home, inviting the students in singly and in groups of two or three, and then sitting and 
talking with them. The conversation would be personal at first, as teacher and student 
found out what underlay the other's reactions. Then it would broaden out, proceeding with 
an awareness of assumptions, predilections and biases. Now the human heart of the subject 
matter of the day's lecture could be taken up intelligently, and that of the morning's head-
lines. The subject would become not just a particular case or a news story but how a decent, 
honest, intelligent man approaches any subject coming within the professional competence 
and obligation of the lawyer. For an hour or so law would be taught as it was a hundred 
years ago when the neophyte learned his profession in the office of an established member of 
the bar. "Reading law" they called it. But it was so much more than that. It was the 
transmission of a tradition of professional service, the handing on perhaps less of informa-
tion than of a spirit and a whole quality of professional competence and responsibility. 
Id. at 180 n.5 (quoting Wirtz, supra, at 20-21). 
As one who was privileged to learn from Rutledge when serving as the Justice's law clerk, I 
can attest to the success of his method. 
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lawyers deal that in many law school classrooms serious examination 
of such problems, and concomitant training in the skills required to 
address such problems, have become passe. 
Finally, Judge Edwards is dismayed - and, in my judgment, prop-
erly so - at the degree to which, in the everyday practice of law, 
dedication to the bottom line seems to take precedence over (1) alle-
giance to norms of ethical conduct and (2) a felt responsibility to take 
up the cudgels for unrepresented litigants. Judge Edwards views the 
failure of practitioners to conform to the rhetoric of high professional 
standards as further evidence of the growing gap between the schools 
and the practitioners. 
I. THE INDICTMENT OF THE LAW SCHOOLS 
Judge Edwards' indictment of the law schools is fueled in substan-
tial measure by rhetoric emanating from the academy. Exhibit A is a 
paragraph from a paper on legal education written by Professor 
George Priest back in 1983: 
The Enlightenment is coming. Its source seems to be the increasing 
specialization of legal scholarship. If these intellectual trends continue 
- as I believe they will - the structure of the law school will change. 
The law school will of necessity become itself a university. The law 
school will be comprised of a set of miniature graduate departments in 
the various disciplines. Introductory courses may be retained (if not 
shunted to colleges). Even then, a wedge deeper than the one we see 
today will be driven between those faculty members with pretensions of 
scholarship and those without. The ambitious scholars on law-school 
faculties will insist on teaching subjects of increasingly narrow scope. 
The law-school curriculum will come to consist of graduate courses in 
applied economics, social theory, and political science. Specialization by 
students, which is to say, intensified study, follows necessarily.4 
4. George L. Priest, Social Science Theory and Legal Education: The Law School as Univer-
sity, 33 J. LEGAL Enuc. 437, 441 (1983). A reading of his immediately preceding paragraph may 
facilitate an understanding of what "Enlightenment" Professor Priest had in mind: 
Behavioral science contradicts the primacy oflaw. As a greater proportion oflaw teach-
ers become interested in the behavioral sciences, the structure of the law school will be 
forcibly changed. A law school, of course, could react to these developments by searching 
out a faculty devoted to the unique interest and importance of the legal system. But that 
will never do. Law school curricula will always follow the most persuasive explanations of 
the law. And the best writing about the legal system is interdisciplinary. As a consequence, 
the structure of the law school and its curriculum must change. Currently, to the student, 
legal education resembles undergraduate education. The student takes a sampler of courses. 
The objective of the course of study is a liberal education: to expose the student to a broad 
set of different subjects. There is little writing and little specialization .... In contrast, the 
virtues of the generalist are foreign to college faculties and unknown in graduate depart-
ments. In this respect, faculties of modem law schools resemble faculties of medieval uni-
versities. We await the Enlightenment. 
Id. at 440. 
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A. Scholarship 
Five years after he started awaiting the Enlightenment, Professor 
Priest undertook to explain the new look of "the theories that domi-
nate modem legal scholarship": 
What has changed in the modern world is that, while the theories 
and organizing structures of traditional legal practice are theories about 
law and are only applicable to law, the theories of modern legal educa-
tion are theories of economists, critical scholars, and sociologists. They 
are theories about behavior or about understanding in which law has no 
special place. 
The most important modern change between the theories underlying 
legal practice and the theories underlying modern legal scholarship re-
lates to the respective source of the theories. Historically, the theories of 
traditional legal practice, because relevant only to legal phenomena, 
were developed only in law schools. The work of the law schools and the 
concerns of the bar were largely identical. Today, however, the theories 
that dominate modern legal scholarship are the theories of modern social 
science or social criticism, and their source is quite independent of law 
schools. These theories are developed in departments of social sciences 
or the humanities by a set of independent scholars. Most importantly, 
these scholars from other disciplines, because they are not burdened by 
the mastery of the legal system's details, proceed at a much faster pace 
and with much greater range than lawyers. The most important differ-
ence between the legal scholarship of today and that of twenty-five years 
ago is the tremendous increase in the velocity of ideas relevant to the 
law.5 
What Professor Priest applauds, Judge Edwards condemns: 
"[T]his is my main point - pure theory should not wholly displace 
the production of treatises or articles that, inter alia, focus on legal 
doctrine. Unfortunately, this displacement is now beginning to occur 
and therewith a grave disjunction between legal scholarship and the 
legal profession."6 
To some extent the polarity between Judge Edwards and Professor 
Priest is more rhetorical than real. Judge Edwards does not insist that 
only "practical" scholarship - the treatise or the doctrinal law review 
article - is of value to lawyers and judges; he acknowledges that vari-
ous kinds of " 'impractical' scholarship also can serve our legal sys-
tem. "7 Further, Professor Priest, for all his professed monasticism, 
5. George L. Priest, The Increasing Division Between Legal Practice and Legal Education, 37 
BUFF. L. REV. 681, 681-82 (1988-1989). 
6. Edwards, supra note 1, at 57. 
7. Id. at 56. For the purposes of this brief commentary on Judge Edwards' essay, I have 
assumed that the distinctions between "practical" and "doctrinal" scholarship and "impractical" 
and "theoretical" scholarship are manifest. But I must confess to some unease about the viability 
of the assumption. To be sure, one can readily assign large quantities of law·related literature to 
one category or another. But a good deal of the literature - including much of some value -
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has in fact been known to consort with the legal laity and even to write 
articles of interest to the laity. 
But· if, nonetheless, we stipulate that a significant amount of cur-
rent scholarship about legal phenomena is written from relatively ab-
struse behavioral science perspectives that are largely inaccessible to 
the bar and to the bench, it still does not follow that there has been a 
radical displacement and consequent dearth of doctrinal literature. 
Law reviews have proliferated in number and in specialization; and, 
concurrently, the established law reviews have broadened in scope.8 It 
would appear that a plenitude of "practical" writing is still available 
- if only lawyers would spend the (billable?) time required to read it, 
cite it, and build on it in their briefs.9 Thus, while it is unsurprising 
that the bar would generally be turned off by the high scholarship10 
that has become very much in vogue in certain comers of the acad-
emy, that is no excuse for turning away from the law reviews 
altogether. 
B. Pedagogy 
Judge Edwards fears that the professors who constitute the "the-
ory" sector of the professoriate have so little interest in what lawyers 
and courts do that they cannot be relied on to carry out in responsible 
fashion the teaching of courses that have conventionally been the heart 
of the curriculum. Had Judge Edwards called Professor Priest to the 
witness stand in support of this aspect of his indictment, he would 
have elicited what appears prima facie to be valuable corroborative 
testimony. In Professor Priest's 1983 paper the following appears: 
From the standpoint of the instructor ... legal education is more primi-
tive than college education, and most closely resembles high school or 
perhaps junior high school education. Today, virtually every law-school 
faculty member is able to teach every subject in the curriculum. One 
might grouse if one were assigned a remote course. But most of us, I 
would guess, would pride ourselves on our ability, were it important 
enough to the institution, to teach any subject at all in the law-school 
would appear to belong in both categories. Moreover, some of the literature has a hard time 
qualifying for either category. 
8. As to the degree of infiltration of "theory" in the law reviews, see Edwards, supra note l, 
at 49-50 nn.44-46. "Theory" may not, in fact, be much of a novelty: Professor Stephen Bur-
bank, in an essay introducing a 1988 symposium on "great" law review articles, finds in the 
symposium papers "reason to doubt claims that legal scholarship today is vastly different than it 
was thirty or fifty years ago." Stephen B. Burbank, "Plus <;a Change ... ?," 21 U. MICH. J.L. 
REF. 509, 510 (1988). 
9. As for judicial reliance on law review articles and other legal materials, see Edwards, supra 
note l, at 49 n.44, 51 n.50. 
10. Some high scholarship - like some low scholarship - seems in fact to be of good 
quality. 
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curriculum. Indeed, the response of all but the junior faculty would be 
to engage in a challenge as to whether one needed one week's prepara-
tion or one day's.11 
Perhaps Judge Edwards made no mention of this portion of Professor 
Priest's testimony because he, like me, finds it improbable that a wit-
ness as talented and insightful as Professor Priest actually believed 
what he wrote. I suspect that Professor Priest was, through hyper-
bole, trying to make a debating point. 12 I do not think Professor 
Priest really thinks that "legal education . . . most closely resembles 
high school or perhaps junior high school education." Indeed, I doubt 
that he would vote tenure to a colleague, however capable a devotee of 
high scholarship, whose attitude towards teaching was that conde-
scendingly myopic. 
Has law teaching deteriorated? Perhaps so, but I am unaware of 
any real evidence to that effect - or, at least, of any evidence that is 
more than anecdotal. 13 If reliable evidence demonstrated that (1) the 
training of newly minted lawyers has markedly slipped and (2) flawed 
teaching - teaching that is disrespectful of the subject matter - is 
disproportionately to be found among professors whose scholarly in-
terests are primarily ~'theoretical," 14 that should raise warning signs 
for the faculty committees primarily responsible for the initial appoint-
ment and subsequent promotion of new colleagues. But before we ac-
cept and act on the proposition that "theory" professors cannot or will 
not teach, the evidence ought to be clear and convincing. 
11. Priest, supra note 4, at 440. 
12. I might add here that I also wonder whether Professor Priest was not a bit hyperbolic on 
the previous page of his 1983 essay when he wrote: 
The demands of scientific theory create extraordinary internal conflict for the lawyer 
who develops an interest in social science. The lawyer-economist, -sociologist, -political 
scientist, -social theorist finds himself a modem-day Henry Adams, whose education 
teaches him that his training is obsolete and that the more he develops his scientific interest, 
the more obsolete his basic training - legal training - will become. The legal scholar may 
have been certain as he selected his career that the law and the legal system were subjects of 
central intellectual importance, but now theory tells him that he was wrong. Those with 
true intellectual courage would abandon the law and become full-time social scientists -
but I know of none who have done so. 
Id. at 439. Maybe Professor Priest meant what he wrote but was misled by Henry Adams. For 
my part, I do not suppose that Henry Adams, notwithstanding his avowals of scholarly incompe-
tence, ever actually entertained the notion that "his training [as a historian was] obsolete." He 
was, after all, an immensely gifted historian, and I think he knew it. 
13. In saying this I certainly mean no disrespect to the former Edwards law clerks whose 
views the Judge systematically collated. I am sure that some of their teachers were below par, as 
were one or two of mine 45 years ago. 
14. By negative implication, Professor Priest offered mild support for such a finding: in talk-
ing about how the "increasing velocity of ideas" makes for "an increasing rate of faculty obsoles-
cence," Professor Priest notes what he regards as the unsurprising corollary "that the best 
prepared law teachers ..• are the most traditional of former scholars." Priest, supra note 5, at 
683. 
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My own sense of the quality of current law teaching is based al-
most entirely on the caliber of the law clerks with whom I have been 
privileged to work over the past fifteen years. I find them to be ex-
traordinarily well-educated - well-read in the law and beyond it -
and highly sophisticated.15 My intuitive judgment is that more and 
more law schools are doing a better and better job.16 
C. The Verdict 
For the reasons stated, I do not think the evidence supports Judge 
Edwards' indictment of the law schools. But the bringing of the in-
dictment has, nonetheless, served a useful purpose. There is not, in 
my judgment, any danger that the law school of the future will fulfill 
Professor Priest's prophecy and "of necessity become itself a univer-
sity." The law school of the future- whether public or private- is 
unlikely to have the resources to pursue such a path; nor should it if 
the resources were at hand. In short, I regard the dangers Judge Ed-
wards perceives to be overblown. Nonetheless, Judge Edwards' essay 
operates as an early warning signal. It is an admonition that law fac-
ulties should, with a view to maintaining a wholesome balance be-
tween the "practical" and the "impractical," continue to be at pains to 
recruit a substantial cadre of persons whose scholarship and whose 
pedagogy will be marked by an informed interest in the world of ac-
tual lawyers, actual judges, actual legislators, and actual regulators. 17 
IS. I must admit that my confidence in current legal education was shaken some time back 
when I found that a law clerk trained at a school that I will, to preserve its anonymity, refer to as 
"Harvard" had never heard of a case called Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824). But, on 
reflection, it came to me that this glaring omission - does an omission actually glare? - was 
neutralized, indeed outweighed, by the fact that she knew everything else. 
Of course, my assessment of the quality of my law clerks' training is highly subjective. None-
theless, I venture the guess that Judge Edwards' assessment of the quality of his law clerks' 
training would be very similar. Concededly, however, the law clerks with whom Judge Edwards 
and I are well acquainted are too few in number to be presented as representative samples of 
lawyers and schools. 
16. A very different picture of the quality of contemporary legal education is presented by 
one of the current rising stars of litigation, Vincent LaGuardia Gambini. Mr. Gambini gradu-
ated from Brooklyn Academy of Law in the mid-l 980s. He reports that at law school he learned 
contracts but not procedure. "The law firm that hires you, they teach you procedures. Or you 
can go to court and wlltch." See MY COUSIN VINNY (20th Century Fox 1992). If you have 
already seen My Cousin Vinny, see it again. (The foregoing is written in shameless imitation of 
The Great Ely Footnote - footnote 63 of Professor John Hart Ely's Constitutional Interpretiv-
ism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399, 414 n.63 (1978), the first portion of which 
reads as follows: "See W. SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH, act IV, scene I. (Actually, I suppose 
you've already seen it).") 
17. I would note that persons trained in law and in another discipline can do valuable "prac-
tical" work and valuable "impractical" work on both the research and teaching sides of the law 
school agenda. But I would also note that possession of a degree in a discipline other than law is 
hardly a sine qua non for valuable research and teaching, whether "practical" or "impractical": 
American law, for all its shortcomings, would have been infinitely poorer had it not been for the 
writing and teaching of some mere LL.B.s. 
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II. ETHICS 
In the closing portion of his essay, Judge Edwards expresses his 
unhappiness with what he sees as the bar's widespread inattentiveness 
to appropriate standards of ethical practice. Judge Edwards defines 
ethical practice broadly, in words on which it would be hard to 
improve: 
"Ethics" may bear upon the practice of law in two different ways. 
First, it bears upon the choice of clients. The good lawyer should not 
simply serve the richest clients, who will pay the fattest fees. Rather, the 
lawyer has an ethical obligation to practice public interest law - to rep-
resent some poor clients; to advance some causes that he or she believes 
to be just; to deploy his or her talents pro bono rather than pro se, at 
least in part. Second, ethics bear upon the lawyer's representation of a 
particular client. This is the domain of professional responsibility: the 
ethical laWYer cannot always advance the client's narrow self-interest, 
because the laWYer is an officer of the court as well as an advocate. 18 
Judge Edwards' strictures with respect to the anti-ethical, includ-
ing anti-pro bono, momentum of increasingly bottom-line oriented 
practice seem to me right on target. Law schools most certainly have 
a responsibility to inculcate both an understanding of the proper way 
to practice law and a commitment to represent the unrepresented. 
Judge Edwards seems to feel that law schools generally are doing far 
too little on these fronts. 19 Perhaps so. But the schools with which I 
am most familiar are putting strong and welcome emphasis on the de-
velopment of programs responsive to such concerns. I cite as one en-
couraging example the statement of the former Edwards law clerk 
whom the Judge identifies as Government Lawyer 2: 
[My law school] offered programs in, and gave serious attention to, the 
problems of under-represented and unrepresented individuals. I person-
ally participated in a program to assist battered wom[e]n obtain TROs 
and other legal redress against those abusing them. In addition, I partic-
ipated in [the law school's] externship program . . . . Both of these pro-
grams helped instill in me a desire to work in the public sector.20 
CONCLUSION 
If the law schools can work to produce, and the profession can 
undertake to recruit, respect, and reward, more lawyers like Govern-
ment Lawyer 2, the integrity of the schools and of the profession will 
be secure. Judge Edwards was right to remind us of Justice Frank-
furter's apothegm that "the law and the lawyers are what the law 
18. Edwards, supra note 1, at 67. 
19. Id. at 73-74. 
20. Id. at 72 (quoting former law clerk). I bet I know what school that is. 
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schools make them."21 
21. Id. at 34 (quoting Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Profssor, Harvard Law School, to Mr. 
Rosenwald 3 (May 13, 1927) (Felix Frankfurter Papers, Harvard Law School Library), quoted in 
RAND JACK & DANA C. JACK, MORAL VISION AND PROFESSIONAL DECISIONS: THE CHANG-
ING VALUES OF WOMEN AND MEN LAWYERS 156 (1989)). 
